Reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from national climate legislation by Eskander, Shaikh M.S.U. & Fankhauser, Sam
1 
 
Reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by  
national climate legislation 
 
Shaikh M.S.U Eskander a, b  and Sam Fankhauserb  
 
June 2020  
 
 
a Kingston University London, Penrhyn Road, Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, UK.  
 
b Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate 
Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton 
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. 
 
Abstract  
The international response to climate change has been inadequate, but not zero. There are 1,800 
climate change laws worldwide. We use panel data on legislative activity in 133 countries over the 
period 1999-2016 to identify statistically the short-term and long-term impact of climate 
legislation. Each new law reduces annual CO2 emissions per GDP by 0.78% nationally in the 
short-term (during the first three years) and by 1.79%  in the long term (beyond three years). The 
results are driven by parliamentary acts and by countries with a strong rule of law. In 2016, current 
climate laws were associated with an annual reduction in global CO2 emissions of 5.9 GtCO2, 
more than the US CO2 output that year. Cumulative CO2 emissions savings from 1999 to 2016 
amount to 38 GtCO2, or one year’s worth of global CO2 output. The impact on other greenhouse 





The international community is not on track to meet the climate change objectives of the Paris 
Agreement1.  According to UN estimates, global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 will be some 
15 GtCO2e higher than required under a 2ºC stabilisation path2.   
Yet countries are taking action against climate change. The Climate Change Laws of the World 
database records 1,800 climate change laws and policies worldwide, covering both mitigation and 
adaptation3.  There is no country in the world that does not have at least one climate change law4.   
In this paper we estimate statistically what this body of legislation has collectively achieved. 
Presumably the law making has had some impact, and global emissions would have been even 
higher in its absence. But by how much?  
The Climate Change Laws of the World dataset is uniquely suited to answer this question. The 
database aspires to be comprehensive, tracking the legislation activities of every country in the 
world over the past 30 years or more.  
The database adopts a fairly broad definition of climate legislation, including parliamentary acts, 
executive orders and policies of equivalent importance. For simplicity, we refer to all these 
interventions as “laws”.  
The database includes both laws that are aimed explicitly at climate change and laws that have an 
impact on climate change. It covers the full range of interventions that is relevant to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, from framework laws (such as, the UK Climate Change Act) and 
dedicated climate measures (e.g., New Zealand’s Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) 
Amendment) to sector policies on energy (e.g., Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act), 
transport (e.g., Brazil’s Mandatory Biodiesel Requirements) and forestry (e.g., the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s Law on Protection of the Nature).  Other laws deal with adaptation, either 
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exclusively (e.g., Japan’s Climate Change Adaptation Act) or in conjunction with wider climate or 
environmental objectives (e.g. the 2050 Climate Strategy of the Marshall Islands). The breadth and 
richness of these measures means that the statistical relationships we find are average associations, 
but that they reflect the impact of law making on emissions, rather than a spurious correlation.  
So far, Climate Change Laws of the World has mostly been used to assess global progress in 
adopting climate policies 5–9, understand the political economy of passing climate laws10–12 and 
identify good practice in climate change governance13. These explorations are part of a wider 
literature on international, national and sub-national climate change governance14–16, on the drivers 
of emission reductions17 and on the political economy of environmental protection18–22.  
The evaluation of public policy is interested in the effectiveness with which policy goals are met, 
but also in the political context in which measures are implemented and their impact on policy 
processes, institutions and the political discourse23–25. Applications are emerging that look climate 
legislation from these angles26–29.  However, the merit of a climate change law ultimately depends 
on its ability to reduce emissions (or climate risks, in the case of adaptation laws).  
Statistical methods provide a powerful, reduced-form way of ascertaining the link between 
legislation and emissions. There is a notable tradition of using statistical techniques to estimate the 
impact of socio-political factors on the environment, including studies on the political economy of 
urban air quality30, energy intensity31 and the lead content of petrol32.  In relation to climate change 
there have been attempts to explain greenhouse gas emissions as a function of socio-economic and 
political factors like fuel exports and the level of democracy33,34. 
This analysis is in the same vein. We use panel data regression to statistically identify the link 
between adopting new climate laws and greenhouse gas emissions per GDP in the country that 
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passes the law. We are interested both in the short-term effect of a new law (its impact on emissions 
within three years) and its cumulative effect, in conjunction with earlier laws, over several years. 
Although some countries had to be dropped for data reasons, we paint a global picture of climate 
change legislation and its aggregate impact on global greenhouse gas emissions.  
Trends in climate change legislation   
Climate Change Laws of the World documents climate change legislation over several decades and 
across the world. While the database is comprehensive, our analysis is restricted, by the availability 
of emissions data, to the legislative activities of 133 countries over the period 1999–2016.  We also 
exclude laws solely dedicated to adaptation, which leaves a body of 1,092 mitigation laws that are 
the subject of our analysis. 
About 40 percent of database entries are legislative acts, passed by parliaments, and about 60 
percent are executive orders, issued by governments. A prominent example of the latter is US 
President Barack Obama’s Clean Power Plan of 2015.  Chinese climate policy also relies heavily 
on executive orders, including pertinent provisions in the 12th and 13th five-year plans. We are 
interested in the combined effect of all these interventions, although we will test whether there is a 
difference between parliamentary acts and executive orders. 
Most climate change laws were passed in the last 20 years (Figure 1a). By the end of 1999, there 
were only 145 such laws worldwide. Some of them were dedicated climate change acts, such as 
Sweden’s Carbon Tax Act of 1991, but many early laws had wider objectives, such as energy 
conservation. After 1999, the number of climate laws began to rise rapidly. Law making reached a 





Figure 1: Climate laws. a. the number of climate laws in use 1990-2019, b. climate laws in 
individual countries, as of 31 December 2019. Panel (a) shows all climate laws (black solid line) 
and all mitigation laws (blue dashed line) for 1990-2019. The green dashed lines identify the period 
1999-2016, which is the focus here. Panel (b) shows the stock of climate laws in individual 




Climate change laws differ in scope and ambition.  Three out of four countries have overarching 
framework laws, specifically aimed at creating an institutional framework to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. A good example is Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change 2012.  Sometimes, 
these frameworks are couched in a wider sustainable development or green growth narrative, such 
as Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan 2016 and South Korea’s Framework Act on Low-
Carbon Growth of 2010.  
However, the majority of climate laws concern sector-specific interventions, in particular on 
energy.  Over half of all climate laws contain provisions about energy supply, such as the promotion 
of renewable energy. Over 40% of laws deal with demand-side energy efficiency, among other 
provisions.  Since most laws deal with more than one issue and energy interventions tend to have 
economy-wide effects, we think of both overarching and sector-specific laws as economy-wide 
interventions. 
On average countries have nine climate laws, of which five to six deal with mitigation, but in some 
cases this number can rise to well over 20 (Figure 1b). For example, Brazil has 28 climate-related 
laws and policies and Spain has 38.  
Our focus on national climate policy means ignoring important initiatives at the sub-national level 
and by non-state actors. State, province and city-led initiatives are particularly important in 
countries with federal structures or where national engagement with climate change has been 
intermittent, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States. In many of these countries, 
climate policy at sub-national level is ahead of the national discourse. Conversely, in EU member 
states a focus on national climate policy would ignore the important role of the European Union in 
7 
 
national climate policy. The EU passed no fewer than 31 mitigation laws between 1999 and 2016, 
including legislation to set up an EU-wide emissions trading scheme and establish ambitious targets 
on renewable energy, which are legally binding for its member states. To reflect this, all EU laws 
are added to the tally of member states. 
A potential problem with Climate Change Laws of the World is that when laws are amended the 
database only records the latest version, thus omitting earlier activities. Legal provisions are often 
tightened over time (as for example Switzerland did when revising its CO2 Act in 2013), but there 
are also cases of reversal (such as the repeal of Canada’s Kyoto Implementation Act in 2012 and 
Australia’s Clean Energy Act in 2014). In each case, these events supersede earlier database entries. 
Climate legislation and emissions intensity  
Our climate legislation data constitute a panel of 2,394 country-year observations (133 countries 
over 18 years). We are interested in annual greenhouse gas (CO2 and non-CO2) emissions per unit 
of economic output (mtCO2e/GDP), a ratio known as emissions intensity, and how it is affected by 
the passage of climate change laws. We use emissions intensity, rather than absolute emissions, to 
reduce the impact of confounding factors like country size and economic performance.  
The hypothesis is that climate change laws codify a country’s policy ambitions with respect to 
greenhouse gas emissions. After a law is passed it will start to affect national emissions.  Some 
laws may kick in immediately, others more gradually or with a delay.  This suggests that in the 
most general model emissions intensity in year 𝑡 is a function of the laws passed in year (𝑡 − 1), 
(𝑡 − 2), (𝑡 − 3) and so on, each lag with a different weight. We aggregate these annual effects into 
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(i) a short-term impact (related to the stock of laws passed in the previous three years), and (ii) a 
long-term impact (related to the stock of laws that are more than three years old).   
The impact of laws on emissions also depends on the discipline with which they are implemented. 
For example, Brazil and Indonesia both have extensive rules on deforestation, but their 
implementation has been patchy35,36.  We control for differences in implementation effectiveness 
through a time-variant indicator on the rule of law, which is taken from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators37.  
The statistical model is completed by a set of control variables on economic factors, weather 
fluctuations and other governance features. We add a country fixed effect to control for time-
invariant factors such as different socio-economic contexts, political cultures and renewable energy 
potentials (e.g. solar irradiance). A time fixed effect controls for inter-temporal trends that are 
uniform across countries, such as the global fall in clean technology costs. Further details are 
provided in the Methods. 
We conduct separate regressions for CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. The current body of 
climate laws has a strong focus on energy and energy-related emissions. There has been much less 
policy attention on agriculture and land use, the main sources of non-CO2 emissions. We 
hypothesise that this difference in legislative emphasis is reflected in the emissions performance of 
CO2 and non-CO2 gases. 
The results suggest that passing a climate change law has a statistically significant, negative effect 
on CO2 emissions per GDP over both the short and long term (Table 1). As anticipated, there is 
less of an effect on non-CO2 gases, where the impact of laws is statistically significant only over 
the long term.  
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Table 1 - Climate laws and their effect on emissions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Other GHGs CO2 Emissions 
   
(L1) Stock of Recent Mitigation Laws  -0.0012 -0.0078*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0021) 
(L1) Stock of Older Mitigation Laws  -0.0065*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) 
(L1) Rule of Law -0.3162*** -0.6164*** 
 (0.1137) (0.1168) 
(L1) HP Filter 0.2229 0.3679* 
 (0.2307) (0.2124) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) -0.2349 1.1623*** 
 (0.1938) (0.2570) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) Square -0.0135 -0.0840*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0138) 
(L1) Import share (% of GDP) 0.0001 0.0018*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) 
(L1) Services share (% of GDP) 0.0025** -0.0029** 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) 
(L1) Temperature (Deviation) 0.0042 -0.0123* 
 (0.0058) (0.0067) 
Federal Systems -0.0141 0.0059 
 (0.0159) (0.0407) 
Constant 1.6213* -4.5877*** 
 (0.8967) (1.2092) 
   
Observations 2,394 2,394 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
R2(within) 0.195 0.214 
   
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are defined as Ln(kg per-$ other GHG Emissions) and Ln(kg per-$ 
CO2 Emissions), respectively. 
   
As the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the regression coefficients in Table 1 have a 
straightforward interpretation. Passing a new climate law reduces annual CO2 emissions per GDP 
in that country by 0.78% in the short term (during the first three years) and by 1.79% in the long 
term (after three years). The impact on non-CO2 gases is insignificant in the short term and about 
a third of the CO2 effect (0.65%) in the longer term.  
It is worth to briefly discuss the main control variables. We find that a strong rule of law – our 
proxy for implementation effectiveness – affects both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions, an issue that 
is explored further below. There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between (the log of) 
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greenhouse gas intensity and (the log of) GDP per capita, similar to an environmental Kuznets 
curve38.  
There is a positive correlation between carbon intensity and the cyclical component of GDP 
(labelled the HP filter, after the decomposition method we use, see methodology section). This is 
consistent with the literature, which has found carbon emissions to be more cyclically volatile than 
economic output39. Emissions grow faster than GDP during upswings and fall more rapidly during 
downturns. Accordingly, a country’s emissions intensity falls when economic activity flat-lines and 
rises when the economy is picking up.  We find no cyclical relationship in the case of non-CO2 
gases, which are associated with less volatile activity.  
Air temperatures above the long-term average are associated with a lower CO2 emissions intensity. 
This suggests that the effect of air temperature on winter heating, which is important for the large 
emitters of the northern hemisphere, dominates the effect of air temperature on summer cooling. 
We do not find a significant relationship between non-CO2 emissions and fluctuations in air 
temperature. This is as expected, since temperature fluctuations primarily affect energy demand 
and therefore CO2 emissions. 
Legislative quality  
The impact of climate legislation on emissions depends substantively on the strength of a law and 
the rigour with which it is implemented. To gain further insights into these questions, we 
experiment with two additional model specifications. The focus is on CO2 emissions. 
First, we analyse the importance of implementation capacity. Implementation capacity is proxied 
by a rule-of-law indicator, which in the main model enters the regression directly. As an alternative, 
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we now interact the rule-of-law variable with the number of laws passed in each year. We can think 
of the resulting variable as the effectiveness-weighted stock of climate laws: each law has a weight 
between 0 and 1 that reflects implementation capacity in the year it was passed. 
The new specification allows us to explore the impact of good or bad implementation on CO2 
emissions (Table 2, column 1). For countries with a middling rule of law score of 0.5 (the mean 
value of the sample, see table S1 in the Supplementary Information), the estimated effect of new 
climate legislation is similar to the main results: A long-term reduction in CO2 emissions of  1.35%  
(0.0270×0.5).  
However, for a country with a strong rule-of-law score of 0.9 (the maximum value observed in the 
sample) the effect is stronger: a 2.43% (0.0270×0.9) fall in emissions in the long run.  In countries 
with weak implementation capacity emissions could fall by as little as 0.27% (0.0270×0.1, the 
lowest rule-of-law score in the sample).  
A second specification explores the difference between legislative acts and executive orders. There 
is a suspicion that legislative acts are a more powerful way to cut emissions.  While Climate Change 
Laws of the World only includes policies that are of equivalent status to an executive order, many 
of them are primarily aspirational.  
To explore this question, we run regressions where parliamentary acts and executive orders are 
entered separately (Table 2, columns 2,3). The empirical results confirm our suspicion. Most of the 
estimated emission reductions can be credited to legislative acts. In the specification where 
legislative acts and executive orders are tested simultaneously, we find no significant effect of 
executive orders on CO2 intensity.  
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Table 2 – Legislative quality results 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Implementation 
quality   Legislative Acts vs Executive Orders 
VARIABLES    Both types  Leg. Acts only 
            
(L1) Stock of Recent Mitigation Laws × (L1) Rule of Law -0.0132***     
 (0.003)     
(L1) Stock of Older Mitigation Laws × (L1) Rule of Law -0.0270***     
 (0.002)     
      
(L1) Stock of Recent Parliamentary Mitigation Acts   -0.0122***  -0.0125*** 
   (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
(L1) Stock of Older Parliamentary Mitigation Acts   -0.0249***  -0.0254*** 
   (0.0017)  90.0017) 
(L1) Stock of Recent Executive Mitigation Orders   -0.0019   
   (0.0036)   
(L1) Stock of Older Executive Mitigation Orders   -0.0034   
   (0.0032)   
(L1) Rule of Law   -0.5333***  -0.5179*** 
   (0.1159)  (0.1159) 
      
(L1) HP Filter 0.4357**  0.4067*  0.4135* 
 (0.2136)  (0.2144)  90.2152) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) 0.8515***  0.8756***  0.8432*** 
 (0.2695)  (0.2544)  (0.2557) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) Square -0.0716***  -0.0700***  -0.0686*** 
 90.0143)  (0.0136)  90.0136) 
(L1) Import share (% of GDP) 0.0020***  0.0020***  0.0020*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
(L1) Services share (% of GDP) -0.0021*  -0.0025**  -0.0025** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
(L1) Temperature (Deviation) -0.0136**  -0.0108  -0.0107 
 (0.0067)  (0.0067)  (0.0067) 
Federal Systems 0.0328  0.0371  0.0421 
 (0.0382)  (0.0363)  (0.0353) 
Constant -3.1774**  -3.2331***  -3.0749** 
 (1.2699)  (1.2006)  (1.2066) 
      
Observations 2,394  2,394  2,394 
Country FE YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES 
R2 (within) 0.214  0.225   0.225 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are defined as Ln(kg per-$ other GHG Emissions) and Ln(kg per-$ 
CO2 Emissions), respectively. 
 
The aggregate effect of climate policy and legislation 
The statistical results at the country-year level can be used to estimate the historical impact of the 
current body of climate laws on global emissions, as detailed the Methods.  The difference between 
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observed actual emissions (which include the effect of climate legislation) and estimated 
counterfactual emissions (which assume no climate legislation) are initially small (Figure 2), For 
CO2, the two curves begin to deviate from about 2004, when legislative activity starts to pick up 
particularly in advanced (EU/OECD) countries. For non-CO2 gases, the two curves remain close 
throughout, reflecting the moderate impact on other greenhouse gases we found in the panel  
 
Figure 2: Emissions path with and without laws. Emissions of CO2 (grey) and other greenhouse 
gases (black) are shown for 1998-2016 for the World and EU/OECD countries. Observed emissions 
(solid lines) include the impact of all legislative activity to date. Counterfactual emissions (dashed 






By 2016 the difference between actual CO2 emissions and the estimated “no legislation” 
counterfactual is 5.9 GtCO2 (Figure 3). This equates to a legislation-induced cut in annual 
emissions of about 15% from a “no legislation” baseline. By comparison, the United States, the 
world’s second largest CO2 emitter, releases 5.2 GtCO2 a year. Avoided non-CO2 emissions are 
much smaller, amounting to 0.6 GtCO2e.  
Two thirds of the estimated CO2 reduction and close to half of the non-CO2 cuts were achieved in 
advanced (OECD and EU) countries, where there are more climate laws and government 
effectiveness is higher. In those countries, climate legislation has succeeded in stabilising carbon 
emissions at 1999 levels. However, globally climate legislation has offset only about a third of CO2 
emissions growth since 1999 (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Change in emissions by gases and region (1999 to 2016).  Emissions for 1999 and 
2016 are the observed emissions for each country group and gas. Emissions “without laws” are 
calculated from the estimated counterfactual emissions path. The “effect of laws” is calculated as 




The difference in area underneath the two emissions trajectories measures the cumulative emissions 
savings between 1999 and 2016 (Table 3).  Since 1999, climate change legislation has saved 37.7 
GtCO2 in CO2 emissions, or about one year’s worth of carbon output. By comparison, the 
remaining carbon budget that is consistent with 1.5ºC is between 420 GtCO2 and 770 GtCO2, 
depending on assumptions40. Without existing climate laws, the remaining carbon headroom would 
be between 5% (37.7/770) and 9% (37.7/420) lower. A further 3.9 GtCO2e was avoided in 
cumulative non-CO2 emissions. 
The results are robust to the alternative specifications reported in Table 2 (aggregate CO2 
avoidance of 36.4 – 39.2 GtCO2) and in the supplementary materials (aggregate CO2 avoidance 
of 27.4 – 37.7 GtCO2).  
Table 3: Total emissions savings by gas and region (1999-2016) 
 
Other GHG avoidance (GtCO2e) CO2 avoidance (GtCO2) 
   
World (133 Countries) 3.9 37.7 
EU/ OECD (41 Countries) 1.5 22.9 
   
Notes. Emissions avoidances are calculated as the total avoided emissions due to laws as percentage of total emissions 
occurred during 1999-2016 for the selected country groups. 
Conclusions 
As countries ratchet up their contributions to the Paris Agreement, it is important to understand 
how effective existing climate legislation has been in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We find 
that the body of 1,092 mitigation laws that we studied (out of a total stock of 1,800 climate laws 
and policies) has made some difference. Passing a new climate law is associated with a reduced 
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emissions intensity both in the short term (within the first three years after their adoption) and 
cumulatively in the longer term.  
Our results therefore underline the importance of a solid legal framework in tackling climate 
change.  They also speak to the crucial role of parliaments: Emission reductions have been driven 
by legislative acts, much more than executive orders. They further emphasise the importance of 
disciplined implementation: The impact of climate laws is significantly higher in countries with a 
strong rule of law, where legal provisions are more likely to be followed.   
The aggregate emissions reductions from the current body of climate laws is sizeable in absolute 
terms: CO2 savings of 38 GtCO2 over the period 1999 to 2016 and a further 4 GtCO2e in non-
CO2 emissions. However, to those who are concerned about the scale of the climate challenge, 
these aggregate cuts will feel like a modest reward for years of negotiation, campaigning and 
concerted global effort. It has increased the remaining carbon space to stay within 1.5°C by just 5-
9%.  
Carbon policy must clearly be tightened to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.  It is safe 
to assume that this means improvement both at the extensive margin (the number of laws) and the 
intensive margin (stronger, better implemented laws). Our reduced-form analysis can shed light 
only on the overall relationship between climate legislation and emissions. It is silent about the 
political, institutional and societal processes through which legislation is turned into environmental 
outcomes.  
There is an emerging literature that begins to study climate legislation in those practical terms26,28.  
Students of climate change legislation have also begun to identify elements of good practice that 
constitute effective climate change governance and the best policies to incentivise emission 
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reductions13,41. If policy makers adopt these lessons, there should over time be a stronger 
relationship between climate change legislation and greenhouse gas emissions than the one 
identified here.  
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The econometric model 
Our hypothesis is that the level of greenhouse gas emissions is a function of, among other factors, 
legislative history. A country’s climate change ambitions need to be codified in policies or laws. In 
the most general model, emissions intensity (that is, greenhouse gas emissions per GDP) in year 𝑡 
would be a function of the laws passed in year (𝑡 − 1), (𝑡 − 2), (𝑡 − 3) and so on, each lag with a 
different weight.  
However, to avoid excessive lags we aggregate legislative history into two time periods: A short-
term variable which consists of the stock of laws passed during the past three years, and a long-
term variable which aggregates the number of laws that are older than three years. This is equivalent 
to assuming identical coefficients for lags in each of these time periods.  We are interested in 
emissions intensity, rather than absolute emissions, to control for confounding factors related to 
population and the economy.  
Formally, we estimate different versions of the following equation using a two-way fixed effect 
panel regression model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐿 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1) 





𝑆 ≡ ∑ 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−𝑘)
3
𝑘=1  is the stock of laws passed in the previous three years, which measures the 
short-term effect of legislation, and 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐿 ≡  ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑘 +  𝑆𝑖0
𝑡−4
𝑘=1  is the stock of laws at the end of year 
(𝑡 − 4), which measures the long-term effect of legislation. 𝑆𝑖0 is the stock of laws at the outset.  
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In one of our specifications, the stock of laws is further split into legislative acts (passed by 
parliaments) and executive orders and policies (issued by governments), each stock with the 
structure described above.  
Vector 𝑿𝑖𝑡 contains a set of control variables, described in more detail below. The model is 
completed by a full set of country and year fixed effects (𝜃𝑖 and 𝑣𝑡) and a random error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
The country effect controls for time-invariant factors such as different socio-economic contexts, 
political cultures and renewable energy potential (e.g. solar irradiance). The time fixed effect 
controls for inter-temporal trends that are uniform across countries, such as the global fall in 
renewable energy costs and developments in climate science.  
Data 
The climate legislation data come from Climate Change Laws of the World. The database includes 
information for 198 jurisdictions (197 countries plus the European Union) until early 2020. Data 
gaps in some of the control variables means we are focusing on 133 countries over the period 1999-
2016, with the lagged variables going back to 1996. We are also excluding climate laws that 
exclusively deal with adaptation, leaving a total of 1,092 laws over 2,394 country-year observations 
(133 countries × 18 years).  
The 1,092 laws cover a wide range of policy measures and ambitions. Tangible initiatives include 
carbon pricing schemes (either taxes or emissions trading systems), support for renewable energy, 
incentives for or regulation on energy conservation, support for low-carbon transport (e.g. 
emissions standards or subsidies for clean cars) and measures to combat deforestation. Many laws 
include sector or economy-wide emissions targets, often aspirational, sometimes legally binding. 
Other laws set up new processes and institutions to monitor, report and verify emission reduction 
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progress. Together with the lag structure, the richness of these measures gives us confidence that 
the relationships we find reflect the impact of laws on emissions, rather than a spurious correlation.  
Climate Change Laws of the World includes the European Union as a separate entity, and we add 
EU laws to the tally of member states, since they have legal force among members (starting from 
the date of EU accession in the case of new member states).   
The vector of control variables, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, has several components. The first component is an indicator 
of government effectiveness, which controls for differences in the rigour with which laws are 
implemented. Our chosen indicator is the Rule of Law variable from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, which captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 







𝑚𝑖𝑛 .  See data availability statement for on access to these data. 
In one of our specifications, the rule-of-law variable is interacted with the number of laws, so that 
the stock of law variables take the alternative form  ?̆?𝑖𝑡
𝑆 ≡ ∑ 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−𝑘)𝑔𝑖(𝑡−𝑘)
3
𝑘=1  and ?̆?𝑖𝑡
𝐿 ≡
 ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑔𝑖𝑘 +  ?̆?𝑖0
𝑡−4
𝑘=1 .   
The next set of controls are economic variables. GDP per capita controls for the possibility of an 
environmental Kuznets curve38. Two further variables, import share and the size of the service 
sector, control for changes in economic structure that may affect the emissions profile. All three 
variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. See data 
availability statement for on access to these data. We note in passing that empirical studies of low-
carbon competitiveness have identified no substantial impact of climate policy on economic 
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performance42. This gives us confidence that the climate legislation and GDP per capita variables 
are independent.  
Greenhouse gas emissions are subject to annual fluctuations, related in particular to the business 
cycle and weather. We control for this by including two variables that measure, respectively, the 
cyclical component of economic activity and deviation from average air temperature. The cyclical 
component of GDP is based on a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) decomposition, an established tool in 
macroeconomics, which is calculated by standard statistical packages43. Fluctuations in air 
temperature are the difference between annual average temperatures and the long-term (1980-2015) 
average. Both temperature records come from the World Bank’s Climate Knowledge Portal. See 
data availability statement for on access to these data. 
The final control variable is a dummy, taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2017 (see 
data availability statement for weblink).44  The variable takes the value of 1 for countries with a 
federal system, where states or provinces have strong legislative powers It controls for the 
possibility that national climate legislation may be complemented by policies at the sub-national 
level and that these competencies may shift over time.  (Time invariant arrangements are picked 
up by the country fixed effect). 
Supplementary Table S1 contains summary descriptions of all variables. 
The total impact of climate legislation 
We use the statistical relationships estimated through equation (1) to calculate a counterfactual “no 
legislation” emissions path, which estimates what global greenhouse gas emissions would have 
been in the absence of any climate change legislation.   
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We start by setting all legislation terms in the estimated equation (1) equal to zero. We then subtract 
this expression from the full estimated equation (1). Using the superscript ̃  for “no legislation” 
terms and ̂  to denote estimated values, this yields 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 −  ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑆 + ?̂?2𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐿          (2). 
Recalling the definition of  𝑦𝑖𝑡  as the logarithm of emissions intensity, we can rewrite the left-hand 
side of equation (1) as: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 −  ?̃?𝑖𝑡 =  ln(?̂?𝑖𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡⁄ ) − ln(?̃?𝑖𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡⁄ ) =  ln(?̂?𝑖𝑡 ?̃?𝑖𝑡⁄ ) (3). 
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields  
?̃?𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?𝑖𝑡  . 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑆 −  ?̂?2𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐿 )     (4). 
      ≈  𝐸𝑖𝑡  . 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑆 −  ?̂?2𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐿 )  
The last step replaces estimated with observed emissions. Global “no legislation” emissions are 
then calculated by aggregating the country-level emissions estimates over countries and time:   
?̃?𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖        (5). 
Data availability statement 
All data used in this study are in the public domain as follows.  
• Climate legislation data are from Climate Change Laws of the World, available at  
https://climate-laws.org/.   
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• Data on the rule of law are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at 
www.govindicators.org and https://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-
governance-indicators. 
• Economic data are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, available 
at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. 
• Data on political systems are from the Database of Political Institutions 2017, available at  
https://publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2017-dpi2017. 
• Temperature data come from the World Bank’s Climate Knowledge portal, available at 
https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data. 
Code availability statement 
The full computer code is available on GitHub (https://github.com/).45  The analysis was carried 





The supplementary information contains an overview and summary statistics of all variables used 
in the analysis.  It also describes the results of robustness checks, which were carried out to 
ascertain the strength of our econometric results. We split the sample, introduce different 
specifications of the dependent variable and experiment with different ways to measure legislative 
activity. The sensitivity checks confirm that our main results are robust, but they add additional 
insights on the relative performance of industrialised and emerging countries.  
Variables Description and Summary Statistics  
Information on the datasets that were used and how to access them is contained in the Online 
Methods. To complement this information, Table S1 contains summary descriptions of all 
variables. 
Industrialised countries vs the rest of the world 
In a first round of sensitivity tests we split the sample into an industrialised country panel and a 
developing country panel. The former group comprises all countries that are members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and  the European Union (EU).  
The hypothesis is that advanced countries, responding to their obligations under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have put in place more stringent legislation. We also 
note that interventions in developing countries are often in the form of policy documents, rather 
than acts of parliament, which have less legal force (see results in Table 2 of the main manuscript). 
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The results confirm that climate laws in industrialised countries have had a stronger impact on 
emissions, particularly in the short-term and with respect to non-CO2 gases. The long-term impact 
on CO2 is broadly the same (Table S2). 
Further robustness checks 
The remaining robustness checks concern changes to the definition or in measurement of some key 
variables (Table S3). The adjustments are made to the regressions for CO2 only.  
The first definitional change concerns the dependent variable. Instead of using emissions intensity 
as the dependent variable, we regress emissions per capita against the effect of climate legislation. 
The results are similar for the variables of interest, confirming the robustness of our main results.  
The second definitional change concerns the way climate legislation in EU member states is 
counted. In the main results, climate laws passed at the EU level are added to the tally of EU 
member states at the time of their accession to the EU. The argument is that those laws are binding 
on member states. However, as a robustness check we explore what would happen if no such 
adjustment was made. The results are robust to this change.  
The third change introduces an additional control variable to measure clean technical progress. The 
rapid fall in the costs of renewable energy technologies like solar PV could be an important driver 
of energy-related CO2 emissions. In the main regressions we rely on country and time fixed effects 
to capture these trends. The former controls for differences in countries’ renewable energy potential 




As a robustness check we introduce an additional variable, the share of renewable energy in total 
energy generation, which serves as a proxy for technical progress. There are alternative proxies of 
technical progress, such as patent data, but they are not sufficiently granular to cover all 2,394 
country-years. There is a possibility that this variable is endogenous (i.e., determined, among other 
factors, by the provisions in climate laws), but the variable is significant, and our main results 
remain intact.   
Table S1 - Variables Description and Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
      
GHG emissions  Other GHG emissions (mtCO2) per 2011 PPP $1 
GDP in year t in country i 
0.347 0.653 0.00670 12.00 
CO2 emissions  CO2 emissions (mtCO2) per 2011 PPP $1 GDP in 
year t in country i 
0.262 0.181 0.0332 1.803 
Laws Number of climate change laws passed in year t in 
country i 
0.575 1.031 0 12 
Mitigation Laws  Number of mitigation climate change laws passed 
in year t in country i 
0.539 0.985 0 12 
Legislative Acts  Number of legislative climate change laws passed 
in year t in country i 
0.293 0.716 0 12 
Stock of Laws Number of climate change laws passed in country i 
until year t 
4.336 5.303 0 45 
Stock of 
Mitigation Laws 
Number of climate change mitigation laws passed 
in country i until year t 
4.142 5.139 0 43 
Rule of law Index of rule of law 0.507 0.200 0.0965 0.920 
GDP per-capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 16,937 18,076 545.7 102,635 
GDP HP filter GDP HP filter  -0.000264 0.0206 -0.181 0.188 
Import share Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 45.69 24.46 8.397 210.4 
Services share Services, value added (% of GDP) 52.99 11.48 12.44 93.72 
Temperature 
Variation 
Difference between the yearly average temperature 
and the long-term (1980-2015) average temperature  
0.306 0.453 -1.726 2.763 
Federal System 1 if states/provinces have legislative powers 0.187 0.390 0 1 
      





Table S2 –Industrialised countries vs rest of the world 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
 EU/OECD Countries  Non-EU/OECD Countries  
VARIABLES Other GHG CO2  Other GHG CO2  
       
(L1) Stock of Recent Mitigation Laws -0.0042*** -0.0046**  -0.0019 0.0013  
 (0.0016) (0.0019)  (0.0033) (0.0037)  
(L1) Stock of Older Mitigation Laws -0.0127*** -0.0083***  -0.0069*** -0.0097***  
 (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0024) (0.0032)  
(L1) Rule of Law -0.9832*** -0.2051  -0.2479* -0.4998***  
 (0.1703) (0.2685)  (0.1379) (0.1336)  
(L1) HP Filter 0.5337** -0.0110  0.2054 0.4448*  
 (0.2311) (0.2305)  (0.2789) (0.2542)  
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) 2.8691*** -0.2547  -0.2482 0.5396*  
 (0.7800) (1.0765)  (0.2873) (0.3108)  
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) Square -0.1755*** -0.0065  -0.0110 -0.0535***  
 (0.0408) (0.0578)  (0.0157) (0.0168)  
(L1) Import share (% of GDP) -0.0002 -0.0013*  0.0002 0.0034***  
 (0.0007) (0.0007)  (0.0005) (0.0007)  
(L1) Services share (% of GDP) 0.0041* -0.0073**  0.0021* -0.0015  
 (0.0024) (0.0031)  (0.0011) (0.0012)  
(L1) Temperature (Deviation) 0.0005 -0.0101*  0.0042 -0.0072  
 (0.0062) (0.0060)  (0.0102) (0.0118)  
Federal Systems -0.0103 0.0196     
 (0.0181) (0.0325)     
Constant -13.0959*** 2.6982  1.7172 -2.1101  
 (3.6938) (4.9767)  (1.2791) (1.4224)  
       
Observations 738 738  1,656 1,656  
Country FE YES YES  YES YES  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
R2 (within) 0.391 0.234  0.165 0.190  
       
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 





Table S3 – Further robustness checks 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Per-capita CO2  Excluding EU laws  Clean Tech 
VARIABLES           
      
(L1) Stock of Recent Mitigation Laws -0.0070***  -0.0049*  -0.0057*** 
 (0.002)  (0.0027)  (0.002) 
(L1) Stock of Older Mitigation Laws -0.0182***  -0.0161***  -0.0138*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0021)  90.0014) 
(L1) Rule of Law -0.5821***  -0.6321***  -0.4050*** 
 (0.1155)  (0.119)  (0.1101) 
(L1) HP Filter -0.4924**  0.3459  0.3862* 
 (0.1998)  (0.2161)  (0.2002) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) 2.3226***  1.3908***  0.409 
 (0.2529)  (0.2577)  (0.2635) 
(L1) ln(GDP per-capita PPP) Square -0.0941***  -0.0954***  -0.0471*** 
 -0.0136  -0.0139  -0.0139 
(L1) Import share (% of GDP) 0.0022***  0.0015**  0.0017*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
(L1) Services share (% of GDP) -0.0037***  -0.0034***  -0.0030*** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
(L1) Temperature (Deviation) -0.0150**  -0.0148**  -0.0047 
 (0.0067)  (0.007)  (0.0062) 
Federal Systems -0.0289  -0.0142  0.0218 
 (0.0404)  (0.0437)  (0.0353) 
(L1) Renewable energy % of total     -0.0112*** 
     (0.001) 
Constant -5.1556***  -5.6668***  -0.5557 
 (1.1875)  (1.2054)  (1.2578) 
      
Observations 2,394  2,394  2,394 
Country FE YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES 
R2 (within) 0.309  0.184  0.277 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Dependent variables are defined as Ln(kg per-$ other GHG Emissions) and Ln(kg per-$ 
CO2 Emissions), respectively. 
 
  
